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ABSTRACT
Jamaica, like many other developing nations, has
recently re-emphasized the cooperative production strategy
in an attempt to increase its rate of agricultural develop-
ment. The establishment of sugar workers' cooperatives was
conceived by Prime Minister Michael Manley in 1972. By
1975, three pilot cooperatives were established and admin-
istered by democratically elected management committees
composed of workers. Following implementation of the pilot
cooperatives several operational problems developed. Most
of these were directly related to low levels of member par-
ticipation and motivation.
The author, as part of a consulting team, was assigned
to study worker attitudes at the Barham Cooperative located
on the Frome estate. A thematic analysis of the partici-
pant observation and interview data is presented. In addi-
tion, a socio-historical analysis, drawn from the litera-
ture, is provided to enable the reader to conceptualize the
various dimensions of the society which enveloped Barham,
to understand why it lacked conditions for success; and to
appreciate the impact of Jamaica's legacy of sugar and sla-
very on the Barham workers' struggle to extricate them-
selves from a position of dependence and submission and
move into a position of relative independence and freedom.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lisa R. Peattie
Title: Professor of Urban Anthropology
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
The Cooperative Process
In a cooperative enterprise, all members are equally
workers, managers and owners. Exploitation and private
accumulation of profit are eliminated and instead, profits
are passed on to cooperators on some equitable basis, or
reinvested in the cooperative to provide improved services.
(Nash and Hopkins 1976:9, Worsley 1971:9.) Cooperatives
can take many forms: consumers', services, merchandising,
credit, producers' and others. In an agricultural production
cooperative, the type referred to here, the land and major
capital items are held in joint ownership by the farm workers
themselves. The land is cultivated collectively and in
principle, every member participates in the decision-making
process concerning all aspects of production, distribution
and investment. (Reed 1975:360.)
Social as well as economic factors shape the outcome
of any cooperative venture. Conditions for social "success"
include the following:
1. Uniformity of Status
Cooperative principles maintain that all members
are equal and to a certain extent, interchangeable. But
formal equality is sometimes contradicted by the division
of labor which frequently emphasizes individuality and
status differentiation; resulting in the subordination of
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some members and domination by others. Such divisions are
inimical to the development of a cooperative spirit because
they tend to reinforce a local elite power base, (Carrol
1969:73, Nash and Hopkins 1976: 15, 25, Hopkins 1976: 101-
102.)
2. Local Initiative and Democratic Control
Local initiative and democratic control are essen-
tial elements of cooperation. In government-sponsored
cooperatives a paternalistic type of relationship often
develops in which continued dependence and control by out-
siders undermines and inhibits self-management. Ambiguities
arise in the roles of managers who are supposed to supervise
workers and at the same time be answerable to them; and in
the roles of members who are supposed to be both workers
and participants in policy-making. This in turn establishes
a "we-they" relationship between members and managers,
fostering mutual resentment and distrust. So it is critical
to achieve a good working relationship between outside
agencies, management and general membership, (Carrol 1969:88,
Hopkins 1976: 102, Dorner and Kamel 1975:8-9.)
3. Maximum Flow of Information
All members of a cooperative must be equipped with
the proper skills and have access to information necessary
for their participation in self-governance in order to
avoid the concentration of power in the hands of a small,
exclusive group. (Nash and Hopkins 1976:12, Engelmarin 1968:
17.)
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4. Ideological Commitment and Solidarity
Many cooperatives fold because their members do not
perceive their own interests to be those of the group, or do
not possess sufficient commitment to cooperative ideals.
Without group consciousness or ideological fervor; such as
that based on rebelliousness against economic monopoly and
exploitation, a cooperative's success will be short-lived.
(Carrol 1969:79, Eckstein and Carrol 1972:247.)
5. A Positive Attitude Towards Work and the Cooperative
Members should have a sense of pride and recogni-
tion of the value of their work, optimism that cooperation
will improve their standards of living and self-confidence
in management operations. In addition, members must share
the belief that the co-op has a real chance of surviving.
This engenders a positive commitment to anticipate and
withstand difficulties, especially those that arise in the
beginning of any new venture. (Reed 1972:361.)
Cooperatives may be either spontaneous or induced.
Generally, landholders who spontaneously set up production
cooperatives are "better of f" farmers who are already
integrated in the market economy. Typically, their farms
have reached a stage of development that requires capital
improvements, (tractors, irrigation, fertilizer, etc.)
but are still too small to afford them. "Self-help"
cooperative organization of small farms enables them to
-8-
create units large enough to take advantage of economies of
scale. (Galjart 1976:333.)
But in developing nations, particularly in agrarian
areas which are still comparatively underdeveloped, coopera-
tives rarely emerge spontaneously. (Galjart 1976:56-57.)
Pessimists attribute the lack of formal voluntary coopera-
tion to Foster's (1965) "image of the limited good":
"According to this view, individual success
in societies in which the consequences of an
expanded economy are understood and accepted
need not be perceived by neighbors as threat
against the community. Under such conditions,
voluntary cooperations can function as an
effective mechanism for promoting social and
economic progress for the group. However,
in a society where members believe that the
economic system is static and non-expandable,
(resources are held to be strictly limited,
thus if some get more others have to get less),
voluntary cooperation can be expected to func-
tion only under exceptional circumstances."
(Carrol 1969:66)
Pessimism notwithstanding, central governments often
encourage or induce the establishment of agricultural
cooperatives for a variety of strategic reasons ranging
from the desire to extend an "arm of government" to rural
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parts in order to mobilize political support and administra-
tive control; to the desire to solve certain fundamental
problems that are perceived to be the results of interna-
tional capitalist development. (Nash and Hopkins 1976:12-
14.) For governments whose reasoning falls in the latter
category, the cooperative structure is often chosen to re-
place foreign corporations with the objective of offering a
more equitable distribution of wealth, power and self-
determination; fulfilling the promise of liberation from
foreign multi-national exploitation and demonstrating con-
fidence in the people's ability to actively participate in
national development. (Engelmann 1968:44, Viquiera 1976:158.)
The Jamaican Experience
Jamaica, like many other developing nations, has recent-
ly re-emphasized the cooperative production strategy in an
attempt to increase its rate of agricultural development.
The cooperative technique of agricultural reform is not new
to the island, but past efforts have been less than success-
ful. A combination of factors have accounted for earlier
failures: poor planning and implementation, ineffective
administration and lack of skilled practitioners, and
limited resources of land and capital. However, the major
reason for previous failures has been the lukewarm reaction
of the country's farming population to such schemes.
(Phillips 1976:561-62, Lefranc 1978:21-39.)
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The establishment of sugar workers' cooperatives was
conceived by Prime Minister Michael Manley in 1972. By
1973, following months of exhaustive groundwork and re-
search, final plans were made to begin the operation of the
cooperatives. The Frome Monymusk Land Company, in conjunc-
tion with other financial and agricultural institutions,
began intensive training programs in order to prepare
workers for the changes to be made. In December 1974, The
Frome Monymusk Land Company established three pilot coopera-
tives which were administered by democratically elected
management committees composed of workers. Lease documents
were signed and in 1975, the cooperatives began operating
as private entities. Soon afterward, the Prime Minister
announced that as part of Government policy, all farms
would in the long term become cooperative. On a phased
basis, almost all of the former estate lands were, by 1976,
transferred to the hands of the workers in the form of
cooperatives; the ultimate goal being to finally end the
dependency relationship between Jamaica and multi-national
firms.
Following implementation of the pilot cooperatives,
the Frome Monymusk Land Company became aware that several
problems were developing in their program. Most of these
were directly related to the low levels of member partici-
pation and motivation. The author, as part of a consulting
team supervised by Professor Orlando Patterson, a Harvard
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sociologist, was assigned to investigate some of the opera-
tional problems that surfaced at the Barham Pilot Coopera-
tive located on the Frome estate.
The following is a more specific itemization of our
research objectives:
1. What motivated workers to join the cooperative?
Were they enticed by the purely monetary fact that
membership ensured receipt of a substantial severance
settlement, or were the other reasons such as pride of
ownership, hope of better long-term rewards, a sense of
community pride etc.?
2. What accounted for the low level of member
participation?
We learned that during the early months of Barham's
history as a cooperative, the participation rate of members
in running a co-op affair was very disappointing: an
average rate of less than 30% attendance at meetings to
be exact.
3. What was the extent of members' knowledge of the
nature and goals of their Cooperative?
An effort was made by the organizers of the co-ops
to promote cooperative principles and to inform members
about the nature of the enterprise with which they were
involved, but the extent of their knowledge was unknown.
4. What are the expectations of Co-op members?
Closely related to objective 3 was our attempt
assess the aspirations of Co-op members with respect to
their program.
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5. Organizational Issues
Finally we investigated the present organizational
and social structure of the Barham Cooperative, its viability
and its influence on relationships between members.
We interviewed a small, randomly selected sample of the
Barham membership to gain a clear picture of the state of
affairs from a worker perspective. However, most of the
information was gathered in our daily interaction with the
workers during their work and social activities. We accom-
panied them to the fields, assisted them in some of their
tasks, ate lunch with the work gangs in the huts and en-
gaged in informal discussions with Co-op members loitering
around the main office.
A thematic analysis of the participant-observation and
interview data is presented in addition to some household
and income data collected on a housing survey questionnaire.
But the author extends her inquiry beyond the boundaries
of the original study. Since the planners at the Frome
Monymusk Land Company were not given a "clean slate" upon
which to design such a program, a socio-historical analysis,
drawn from the literature, is provided to enable the read-
er to conceptualize the various dimensions of the society
which enveloped Barham, to understand why it lacked the
aforementioned conditions for success; and to appreciate
the impact of Jamaica's legacy of sugar and slavery on the
Barham workers' struggle to extricate themselves from a
position of dependence and submission and move into a posi-
tion of relative independence and freedom.
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CHAPTER II THE SOCIAL REALITY OF THE CANE WORKER
The Plantation as a Social Institution
Most characterizations of the modern plantation limit
themselves to descriptions of its performance as an insti-
tution of conomic production. From a strictly economic
viewpoint, plantations typically involve employment of vast
areas of land and large numbers of unskilled workers under
a single, centralized corporate control, to produce an
agricultural export commodity. The raw material is usually
processed in a heavily capitalized factory under the same
control, and exported to be sold on an international market
subject to external demand and price fluctuations.1
Equal in importance is recognition of the plantation as a
social institution which molds human relationships and
attitudes into a structure which conforms to its economic
purpose. It did so in the past, and does so today.
Under the scepter of slavery, the Jamaican sugar
plantation had an all-embracing and brutal control over the
lives of Black laborers. More than 140 years have elapsed
since Emancipation yet, in the wake of progress and moderni-
zation, fundamental features of the old slavery system
still remain intact. It is useful to briefly examine
this historical continuity, with particular regard to
plantation social structure as it relates to the plight of
agricultural field workers. This will set the stage for
the later discussion of Jamaican sugar workers' cooperatives.
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The Birth of King Cane
Jamaican society was concieved to accomplish one clearly
defined objective: to generate profit from the production
of sugar. It necessarily follows that the sugar plantation
was not just one of several institutional components, but
the cornerstone of the entire socio-economic structure.
(Patterson 1967:9.) Its beginnings can be traced back to
the 17th century, when the British Government unsuccessfully
tried to encourage colonial settlement of Jamaica, to
facilitate military maneuvers against the Spanish. (Hall
1959:7.) Accompanying the policy of promoting colonization
through small-scale diversified farming, were the efforts
of some of the more prosperous settlers to occupy the best
land. (Patterson 1967:16.) Following the example set by
the Dutch in other parts of the Caribbean, wealthy British
settlers staked out large, fertile tracts and developed
suitable infrastructure for large-scale sugar production.
Access to financial backing and manipulation of the local
legislature gave the planters the economic and political
leverage necessary to transform Jamaica into a highly
profitable sugar enclave. However, the planters' recipe
for greed and opulence lacked one essential ingredient:
an abundant supply of cheap labor. An apparent disinclina-
tion to soil their hands with manual labor led the planters
to seek outside assistance.
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The Arawaks, indigenous inhabitants of Jamaica, were
unavailable, having been ruthlessly annhihilated by the Span-
ish prior to the British occupation. Poor Whites were low
in number and difficult to recruit and retain. Most had
been sent to Jamaica as indentured servants and owned only a
specific term of service. Since the laws concerning them
were very harsh, the idea of remaining, after their time was
served, must have been less than appetizing. (Patterson:
1967:46.)
But the British planters perserved, undaunted by these
inconveniences, and adopting the diabolic solution chosen
by their peers throughout the New World, turned to the
African Slave Trade. Wholesale subjugation of African
peoples to bondage and forced importation of their labor
power produced the desired input. By the end of the 17th
century, Jamaica's society and economy rested on a group of
large plantations2 manned by enslaved Black people. (Patter-
son 1967:24.)
Social Relations of Production on the: Old Plantation
Small farmers, unable to compete with the large estates
and plagued by disease, erop failure and natural disasters,
eventually decamped. Consequently, most of the land and
slaves came to be oligopolized by a handful of rich propri-
etors who, having made their fortunes, left for England.
Absentee ownership became dominant. (Patterson 1967:16.)
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White personnel recruited from Britain and former bond-
servants became the new managerial staff and ranked highest
in the structure of local authority and status on the planta-
tion. The overseer was the manager of the estate and in
absence of the owner, was the highest immediate authority.
He answered only to the owner's attorney who made production
decisions. Lower staff members and their assistants alter-
nated between supervision of labor and allocation of supplies.
(Patterson 1967:56, Craton 1978:11.) Slaves, by definition,
occupied the lowest position.
Full appreciation of the heinous atrocities committed
against slaves remains compromised by a dearth of written
accounts by the victims themselves.3 Several salient fea-
tures of slavery are nevertheless clear. Under its reign
Jamaica became, in Patterson's view, (1967:9) "...a mon-
struous distortion of human society. It was not just the
physical cruelty of the system that made it so perverse...
What marks it out is the astonishing neglect and distortion
of almost every one of the basic prerequisites of normal
human living". In addition to the catastrophic displacement
from their homeland, Blacks suffered from instability in
personal, sexual and family relations. Legal rights,
marriage, practice of religion and education were forbidden,
as well as any other social and cultural expressions that
might have undermined White authority. (Patterson 1967:274.)
To justify their inhumanity, Whites deemed blackness to be
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a symbol of inferiority. It is an understatement, at best,
to say that colonial racism has had far-reaching, devastating
repercussions that extend to the present, both on the planta-
tion and in the society at large. (Cumper 1954:157.)
Slaves were powerless in determining status classifica-
tions within their group. Social rank and occupational
divisions among them were those decided upon by the White
masters. (Patterson 1967:65.) And so, a class/color
hierarchy based on the percentage of White blood and visible
Caucasion features was established; those of fairer hue be-
ing accorded greater prestige. These social categories,
defined by gradations in skin tone, spawned antagonisms
between people of varying degrees of African descent, (Hall
1959:137) and can reasonably by understood as subtle mech-
anisms of social control (i.e. "divide and conquer").
Domestic slaves were considered to be in a more "hon-
orable" position than other slaves. Most of them were the
lighter-skinned offspring born to Black women who were
victims of rampant sexual exploitation and abuse--either
outright rape or compulsory concubinage--by White plantation
management. Since manual labor was considered unbecoming,
mulatto and quadroon women were brought into the master's
greathouse to perform household and sexual chores, while
their darker sisters worked in the fields. (Higman 1976:2.)
The prestige position of domestics was closely followed
by a class of skilled craftsmen and artisans such as boil-
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erman, coopers, smiths, carpenters etc.; and then by a small
group of foremen, called "headmen" and "drivers" who, given
the incentive of preferential treatment, were the owner's
practical instruments for effective command and management
of the field slaves. Given the nature of the job, it was
not uncommon for sadistic, power-hungry types to occupy
these supervisory positions. (Patterson 1967:62-63.)
Field slaves, the rock bottom, were regarded as beasts
of burden. Although priced highly because of their directly
productive activities, the nature of their work cast them
to the bottommost rung of the ladder. Opportunities for
upward mobility were only available to a select few and,
changing jobs most often meant making a lateral move from
one form of brutal labor to another. (Craton 1978:140.)
These slaves were divided into three gangs according
to age, strength and function. The first gang contained
the strongest adults who were pushed hardest. The second
consisted of children over twelve, older adults, the handi-
capped and infirm. The third, called the "hogmeat gang",
contained young children, ranging in age from four to
eleven. (Patterson 1967:59.) The slaves were awakened from
their huts several hours before dawn, and driven relentless-
ly under the whip until after sundown. Work dragged on
for 18 hours a day and 7 days a week during the 5 to 7-month
harvest season, and 16 hours a day, 6 days a week after
the harvest.4 (Patterson 1967:67, Craton 1978:67.)
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Sugar cropping was then and still remains an intensely
systematized, grueling operation, aptly described as
"military agriculture". (Thompson 1959.) The heavy, cumber-
some sugar canes had to be ground as soon as they were cut
or the yield of juice would shrink, ferment and spoil. It
was therefore necessary for the conversion of each stalk
into sugar to be completed within a few hours. Cutting,
hauling, grinding, boiling, clarification, filtration, evapo-
ration and crystallization had to be carried out in an un-
interrupted, synchronized fashion at high levels of speed
and precision. Round-the-clock shifts were an absolute
necessity at harvest time. (Hall 1959:13.) Manpower was
not spared, however, even after the crop had been reaped.
Ploughing and planting of new canes was equally as arduous
and greatly detested by the slaves. After planting the cane,
corn was cultivated to feed slaves and farm animals, followed
by weeding, repair tasks, maintenance and transporting sugar
to the wharves for export. (Patterson 1967:65-66.)
Discipline, accountability and routine, lifeblood of
the system, were enforced in all areas and phases of work.
Delegation of tasks was designed to maximize prolonged
exertion and slaves were allowed to rest only when it suited
the supervisions. (Aufhauser 1972:44.) They were regularly
ordered to perform specific jobs, and if the work was not
completed in the expected fashion, they were punished with
extra work or physical abuse. Owners preferred to keep
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slaves busy, even with purposeless, unnecessary chores rather
than allow them to engage in other activities. (Aufhauser
1972:41.) Overseers, paid by commission, worked slaves
beyond their physical capacity in order to obtain high re-
turns. (Patterson 1967:43) One account reports:
"It was more the subject of the overseers to work
the slaves out, and trust for supplies from Africa,
because I have heard many of the overseers say,
'I have made my employer 20, 30 or more hogsheads
per year than any of my predecessors ever did, and
though I have killed 30 or 40 Negroes per year
more, yet the produce has been more than adequate
to that loss'" (Patterson 1967:44 from ". ..Minutes
of Evidence", 1790-91).
Overwork, inadequate rest and poor diet took their toll
5
on the Black population. During the 18th century, the
annual natural population decrease ranged from 1.5% to 3.7%,
(Patterson 1967:97.) Approximately one-third of all new
slaves died within 3 years of arriving on the plantation.
(Craton 1978:19.) Natural reproduction was considered an
economically impractical method of replenishing the work-
force, because the management viewed pregnancies and Black
babies as costly nuisances. High mortality and low re-
production rates, did not trouble the colonial authorities
as long as the African Slave Trade continued to replace
the dead at a fair price. (Hall 1959:23.)
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When sugar production reached its zenith in Jamaica,
there were just enough Whites to fill supervisory positions.
Ratios of Blacks to Whites were extremely high and averaged
over ten to one. (Patterson 1967:274.) As a result there
was a supervision problem and slaves could often outwit
their taskmasters. Weary of Sisyphean toil with no hope of
material or spiritual reward, Blacks thwarted White domina-
tion in various ways. Forms of resistance ranged from
relatively indirect tactics, such as manipulative role-
playing of submissive stereotypes, deliberate inefficiency,
refusal to work and running away; to more direct measures
such as murder and violence. (Patterson 1967:260-63.) The
rulers, conscious of their small numbers, strictly enforced
repressive slave laws. Insurrection, a common occurrence
in Jamaica, was punishable by being nailed to the ground
and slowly burned to death from the feet up. For lesser
"crimes", males were castrated or had their limbs amputated.
These were codified punishments; England playing a major
role in formulating the slave laws in an attempt to protect
her financial interests. After all, West Indian cane fields
bore some of the fruits that nurtured the Industrial Revolu-
tion and other forms of wealth accumulation. (Hall 1959:81,
Williams 1964.)
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Transformation of Plantations: From Propri:etOr to
Corporation
The decline of the old plantocracy was attributable to
several factors. Slave uprisings, soil exhaustion, an
unprecedented series of natural disasters and mismanagement
due to owner absenteeism were chronic sources of domestic
trouble; but, external market forces proved to be the most
formidable foe. (Beckford 1972:103.)
Currency used by Jamaican planters during slavery era
was drawn from trade with the Spanish but there was little
of it in circulation. Increasing demand for payments in
cash instead of sugar in business transactions, especially
with slave traders and the newly independent United States,
weakened terms of trade considerably and left the planters
in an impotent bargaining position. In addition, supplies
of capital goods and food from the ex-colonies were cut
off after the American Revolution. Supply shortages spurred
a rise in production costs and the cost of living. Patterson
1967:27.)
Entry of sugar-reproducing competitors in the world
market induced a downward trend in prices, while at the
same time, the planters' adherence to technically obsolete
methods kept production costs high. Profits declined since
sugar could be obtained elsewhere at far more reasonable
prices. Britain rescinded its protective sugar trade agree-
ments with Jamaica and simultaneously increased duties
on all imports in order to sustain its war effort. 6
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Shipping prices soared in response to the war and increased
international demand. By the early 1800's, the price for
Jamaican sugar had slumped well below its production, trans-
portation and taxation costs. Financial intermediaries and
creditors of the plantation proprietors began to foreclose
on the weaker estates and assumed ownership in a last-ditch
effort to salvage their Jamaican assets. (Patterson 1967:
27.) Finally, abolition of the Slave Trade curtailed the
labor supply and planters could no longer produce enough
sugar to pay off their debts. At Emancipation, in 1838,
two-thirds of the labor-force left the plantations. Lack
of liquidity to pay wages to those remaining forced many
more estates to close. (Cumper 1954:138.)
In panic, the remaining planters made frantic attempts
to keep Blacks in the canefields. Abortive efforts to
secure ex-slave labor on an apprenticeship basis were
superseded by enactment of legislation and taxation schemes,
devised to make it difficult for Blacks to secure land and
pursue social and economic independence. Payment of taxes
required id cash, which could only be secured by wage
labor. (Beckford 1972:90-91.) Exorbitant rents, also pay-
able in cash only, were charged for occupancy of former
slave huts, with constant increases for those families
who did not work full-time on the estate. Furthermore,
the colonial legislature passed a small debt act which
ordered that tenants in arrears could be evicted and desig-
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nated legal vagrants, Simultaneous passage of the Vagrant
Act was passed dictated that all those found without a
dwelling place or steady employment could be seized to work
in chains for 60 days on plantations. In general, blacks
were actively discriminated against in land sales and prices
were prohibitively raised beyond their means. Afhauser 1972:
55-56.) These obstinate endeavors to reinstate a slavery-
oriented system were, indeed, exercises in futility. In
Patterson's (1969) words, asking a Black to remain on a
plantation was tantamount to "asking a Jew to remain in a
German concentration camp". They fled and sought sanctuary
in the surrounding hills, on old ruined estates, marginal
lands, or undeveloped tracts. (Cumper 1954:138.) The more
fortunate were able to acquire arable land in sufficient
quantity to become successful peasant farmers and separate
themselves entirely from the plantation. Tragically, not
all Black Jamaicans could find sufficient resources to be-
come independent and many continued to reside on the es-
tate itself or in its immediate environs. Some tended
smaller plots but remained partially dependent on planta-
tion wage labor during those months when they were not
occupied with sowing and harvesting their own land. Others
were doomed to remain part of the plantation's full-time
workforce, supplemented by indentured East-Indian and
Chinese immigrants. (Cumper 1954:138.)
Meanwhile, estate owners continued to be tormented by
financial encumbrances and declining production rates. 7
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Use of outdated production techniques escalated costs, while
market prices dropped, and severely diminished the marketa-
bility of Jamaican sugar. Lack of liquidity limited access
to new cost-reducing technology. Moreover, owners simply
did not have the "human capital" needed to modernize the
production system; advanced business management techniques
and larger, more complex organizational structures were
prerequisites for handling highly capital-intensive opera-
tions, not to mention the challenge of bartering on the
international market. (Beckford 1972:85.)
In the late 19th century, having completed the process
of estate foreclosure, former creditors became new owners
and established British-based, limited liability companies
to manage the plantations. Corporate sovereignty marked
the ascendancy of the multinationals, in the 1920's and
1930's, which presently account for the bulk of West In-
dian sugar production and trade. (Beckford 1972:85.)
Although sugar never regained its preeminence in the
Jamaican economy, corporate ownership revived the moribund
industry by promoting centralization and expansion of
capital, technological advancement and efficient reorgani-
zation. But just as corporate enterprise demanded elimi-
nation of inefficiencies, it preserved those features which
served the firm's profit-making ends. Above all, profit-
able sugar production still required an easily available,
controllable, large, cheap labor supply. This largely ex-
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plains why remnants from the old estate system are most
strikingly visible in the rigid plantation structure today;
particularly with respect to the socio-economic rut it
relegates to agricultural field workers.
Wage Slavery on the Modern Plantation
As in earlier centuries, the basic class structure of
the modern plantation is determined by production roles.
Starting at the top, the modern corporate plantation is
governed by a Board of Directors who are responsible to a
parent company in the United Kingdom. The Resident Mana-
ger implements the decisions of the Board, and similar to
his colonial forerunner, commands a great deal of local
authority. (Cumper 1954:141.) Specialized daily decision-
making is delegated to estate division managers and depart-
ment heads who direct lower staff members, assistants and
overseers. These in turn supervise foremen and headmen.
The laborers are the last link in the chain of command.
Status distinctions within this group are similar to those
created during slavery. The skilled are differentiated
from the unskilled, hence factory workers are viewed as
being better off than unskilled field workers. Ironically,
Emancipation failed to change the relationship between
power and prestige and color of skin. Even though Jamaica
is an overwhelmingly Black nation (over 90%), top manage-
ment slots on the new plantations were given to new White
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immigrants. Many middle management positions were filled
by the rising Jamaican "colored" middle class and some of
the more prosperous East Indians. Racial barriers relaxed
somewhat, but the new "Brown" recruits assumed and retained
nearly all the socio-economic traits, and many of the atti-
tudes, of their White predecessors. All of this left the
largely European upper ranks and predominantly light-skinned
middle management socially and economically far removed
from the largely Black and East Indian laboring class.
(Cumper 1954:153.)
The iron-fisted authority of the ruling class still re-
veals itself through interpersonal relations in the planta-
tion community. As Beckford (1972:206 ) points out: "It
is evident that in every aspect of life, a strong authori-
tarian tradition can be observed. Anyone with the slight-
est degree of power over others exercises this power in a
characteristic, exploitative authoritarian manner and
attitudes toward work clearly reflect the plantation in-
fluence. Overseer types never do manual labor and laborers
consistently devise ways to beat the system".
Agricultural workers make up approximately 80% of the
plantation labor force. (Beckford 1972:263-65.) The number
of unskilled workers concentrated under a single authority
may now have reached an historical maximum since the tra-
ditional estate was much smaller in size.8 (Cumper 1954:
153.) Although legally "free", the average worker has few
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options for improving his situation within the inflexible
plantation structure. Given the current Jamaican economic
unemployment crisis (25% to 30%), abandonment of one job in
search of another is a perilous risk that most cannot afford
to take. Victimized by such limitations, the agricultural
laborers form what Mintz calls the "rural proletariat"; a
landless, propertyless (in the sense of productive property),
class which depends primarily upon the sale its labor to the
plantation, and whose existence is "...predicated on the
existence of other classes who own the instruments of pro-
duction, provide the work opportunities, pay the wages and
sell the commodities to be bought". (Mintz 1953:139-141.)
Fieldwork is still largely labor-intensive and the
work process itself bears a close resemblance to the slave
regimen described earlier. In fact, many sugar workers
refer to working in the cane as "wage slavery". Technologi-
cal advances have made no breakthroughs in discovering ways
to subdue the broiling heat of the Jamaican sun, to ward
off irritating insects and plants, to soothe blistered hands
and aching backs, and to erase scars permanently etched by
unwieldy machetes.
Canefield burning, an innovation introduced by the
sugar companies, elimianted troublesome undergrowth and
enabled cane workers to double their cutting speed. But
10instead of a commensurate raise in pay in return for
increased production, canecutters were rewarded with an
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increased risk of lung disease from burnt cane soot inhala-
tion. (Phillips 1976:438.)
New machinery stepped up efficiency, but it also made
it possible for complex tasks to be broken down into simpler
ones. As the operations became more finely divided, each
task required less training and the individual worker be-
came more easily replaceable. Smooth substitutability of
unskilled workers plus the fact that the demand for labor
was always less than manpower available left workers at the
mercy of corporate management. (Aufhauser 1972:121.)
In addition, it should be mentioned that the demand for
labor by the sugar industry has traditionally been greater
in the harvest season than in the remaining months of the
year. Increased mechanization of cultivation further in-
creased the seasonal variation in labor demand (Cumper 1954:
154) to the point that in some cases five times as many
workers are needed to cut cane than to cultivate it. (Craton
1978:293.) Labor demand also varies widely over longer
periods depending upon the state of the sugar market, which
suffers from cyclical instability due to drastic unpre-
dictable price fluctuations. Clearly, for most sugar
workers, reliance on wage employment for income is tenuous
at best and reinforces management power over the workforce.
Even the skilled factory worker, laid off for the out-of-
crop season, is compelled to conform to the estate's idea
of the "good" employee, by his pressing need to be rehired
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next crop. (Cumper 1954:154.) In essence, the slave's fear
of losing life or limb as punishment for noncompliance
with management directives and expectations has been re-
placed by the worker's fear of losing his sole source of
income.
A whole body of Caribbean research portrays plantation
communities as being loose-knot, weak and unstable; with
values and attitudes that enable people to "cope" with their
circumstances but impede continuous mutual cooperation and
11interdependence. In Mintz' view, the culture of the
laborers bends to the productive goals of the estate.
(Mintz 1959:46.) Corporate control over employment and
fierce competition of jobs engenders a divisive undercurrent
within the plantation community and irregular labor demand
is declared the leading culprit. Seasonal changes in
plantation labor requirements encourage considerable short-
term labor migration between the estate and surrounding
areas. The influx and outflow of transients "...creates,
as it were, a recurrent social revolution, transforming
the ordinary routine and rhythm of life". (Clarke 1957:24.)
As the housing shortage intensifies, newcomers move in and
impose changes in the constitution of existing of households
and temporary relationships and living arrangements are
frequently set up by men and women workers. Naturally,
migrants remain very much attached to communities outside
of the plantation community in which they work. (Phillips
1976:312.)
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Following the harvest, after a 5 to 7 month separation from
their families, migrants return to their hometowns, leaving
their temporary households behind. This creates a situa-
tion in which family members, usually male household heads,
are absent for long periods during the year. Seeking the
comforts of home, they begin new families in the estate
areas, to which they bid farewell when harvest ends. Given
these conditions, it is evident that plantation hiring
patterns contribute to familial instability. Many workers
are forced to endure disjunction in personal, sexual and
familial relations, akin to that imposed during slavery,
though admittedly less disasterous. (Clarke 1957, Patterson
1967, Thompson 1959.)
Earnings tend to fluctuate from a relatively high
level in the crop season to bare subsistence level or be-
low it in "dead" season, adding a cyclical boom or bust
effect to community lifestyles. (Clarke 1957:24.) Pressures,
arising from the uncertainty of regularly making enough
money for even bare human maintenance, breed strong in-
12
dividualism and interpersonal rivalry. People are forced
to compete with one another for jobs and to attempt to win
favor with plantation management, (Beckford 1972:203-206)
just as slaves might have appealed to the paternalistic
indulgence of the master.
"Busha", as the overseer is still called, holds a
great deal of discretionary power. Work is assigned on a
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piece-rate basis and overseers personally hand pick the
gangs. Since estate labor, on the average, exceeds effect-
ive labor demand by 25% to 30%, "Busha" i.s able to main-
tain a patronage system whereby cooperative workers are
rewarded with jobs and subversive workers are punished with
joblessness. (Stone 1978:2.)
Issues of land and labor are shared primary concerns
among workers, who are well aware of their predicament.
As one author observed:
"...indeed when one lives in a plantation
community it quickly becomes apparent that
the land and its exploitation, the ways of
working on the land, relationships which
arise from this work and from the dominant
ownership of the land by a single owner,
the pain of the workers at being landless,
the strong desire for land and such re-
lated themes together constitute a major
thread in the lives of the people in such
a community". (Phillips 1976:49.)
But as Jayawardena (1963) witnessed in Guyana, class
consciousness among sugar workers is double-edged. On one
hand, most workers are cognizant of the fact that other
workers face equally dire straits and share common concerns.
Such class awareness led to the rise of militance and
unionism among Jamaican sugar workers in the 1930's. 11
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On the other hand, acquaintance with the plight of fellow
workers also allows greater appreciation of the desperate
acts that others commit and are likely to commit in order
to survive in the system, and consequently sows seeds of
suspicion and distrust. Underlying tensions, aroused by
this particular kind of cautiousness, make it difficult
to mobilize cooperative action, and if anything brings
forth a clash of interests. Perhaps this partially ex-
plains why trade unionism has restricted its activities to
piecemeal remedies, such as wage negotiation and grievance
settlement, and has not achieved structural change in the
industry. (Phillips 1976:434, 226-27.)
Conclusion
The rigid authoritarian plantation structure, a con-
tinuity from the old system to the new one, offers very
limited opportunities for agricultural workers to improve
their socio-economic circumstances and perpetuates the
image of fieldwork as "wage slavery". Beckford (1972:206)
neatly sums up the main points:
"...On the whole the plantation has a demorali-
zing influence on the community. It destroys
or discourages the institution of the family
and so undermines the entire social fabric.
It engenders an ethos of dependence and pa-
tronage and so deprives people of dignity,
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security and self-respect. And it impedes the
material, social and spiritual advance of the
majority of people. In these circumstances
we could hardly expect to find a highly
motivated population displaying the kinds
of characteristics that development demands.
The energies of most people are spent trying
to beat the system. Traditions, values, be-
liefs and attitudes which have become es-
tablished as a result of long periods of
plantation influence are, for the most part,
inimical to development".
The sugar workers cooperative program set out to
revamp the traditional estate power structure and to
rectify some of these problems in at least one fundamental
way: control of estate lands, previously the exclusive
right of corporate management, was to be given to the
workers. The next chapter will discuss how this transition
was more difficult to achieve in practice than to imagine
in theory.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II
1. See Cumper (1954:153), Mintz (1959), Padilla (1959) and
Beckford (1972).
2. The average plantation consisted of approximately 1500
acres, (extrapolated from Patterson (1967:53) and was
served by an average of 223 slaves. (Higman 1976:23)
3. In Jamaica, there is no equivalent to the treasury of
first-hand recollection compiled in the 1930's from
survivors of the last throes of American slavery.
(Craton 1978:viii-ix) Current information regarding
working and living conditions under slavery is largely
drawn from primary sources written 17th and 18th cen-
tury colonialists. Though graphically descriptive in
content and undeniably invaluable, the authenticity of
the primary material is limited by social boundaries
between writers and subjects. -Most of the recent
works explore more theoretical issues, such as compara-
tive analyses of slave systems, studies of surviving
African cultural elements and assessments of slavery's
profitability. While these types of investigations
are all important contributions to the field, they
invite the reader to become immersed in academic ab-
straction and thereby evade the harsher realities of
human suffering. Patterson (1967) is one of the few
to offer a more sensitive perspective, without sacri-
ficing rigorous scholarship.
4. Except during harvest time, slaves on some plantations
were spared from the canefields 1 to 1 days each
weekend to cultivate the "Negro Grounds" which yielded
their food. (Craton 1978:50.) Out of an entire year's
labor, the slave consumed goods which only took a
few weeks to produce. It has been estimated that a
slave and his family could live comfortable year-round
on the produce yielded from only 35 days labor on the
grounds. Most of the surplus was consumed by residents
of the Great House, but some fruits and vegetable were
sold and exchanged among the slaves themselves.
(Aufhauser 1972:37.)
5. High mortality rates and low reproduction rates were
characteristic of all sugar colonies. Between 1680
and 1786, 2,130,000 Blacks were brought from the Afri-
can continent to the British West Indies. By the early
19th century, only about 700,000 remained. (Hall 1959:13.)
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6. In 1806, sugar duties comprised 61.7% of its wholesale
price. (Patterson 1967:27.)
7. In 1805, Jamaican sugar production reached a high of
99,000 tons and by 1913, a low of 4,891 tons. (Deerr
1950) Sugar prices fell rapidly in 1895 and amounted
to only one half of the price prevailing in the
eighties. The quantity of sugar exported fell by 50%
between 1830 and 1840 and remained at the lower level
for over 70 years. The combined effect of the decline
in quantity and price was the gradual fall of the
value of sugar exports from J$2.6 million in 1832 to
J$418.4 thousand in 1910. (Jefferson 1972:91.)
8. In a sense, the growth of the estate has even extended
its field of'operation, both by the concentration of
diversely owned areas under one control and by the
need to provide certain quasi-public services (water,
electricity, roads) on a scale approaching that of a
local government authority. (Cumper 1954:141.) Frome,
one of the larqest estates occupies some 30,000 acres.
(Cuiper 1954:119.)
9. Ownership of land has always been cherished by Jamaicans
as it represents independence, security, dignity and
is something of great value to be passed on to ones
children. (Clarke 1957)
10. Basis of payment for canecutting is not standardized
and varies according to the Company's dictates and the
going price for sugar on the world market. There is
a limitation of how much can be packed and shipped to
the refinery for processing, and since cane spoils
rapidly, canecutting is stopped when a surplus piles
up. In sum, no benefits are derived from increased
effort, since higher productivity does not necessarily
bring higher wages.
11. See Beckford (1972), Clarke (1957), Cumper (1954),
Mintz (1953), and Patterson (1967).
12. Recent studies of sugar workers in Jamaica (Jamaica
Daily News 1973:47) and elsewhere indicate that a great
majority of them are habitally undernourished. Eat-
ing is not only a means of satisfying hunger, but a
necessity if one is to continue to work and earn in-
come. Although many sugar workers survive on very
meager diets and manage to work hard, they pay the
price of sickness and early death. The average diet
of many canecutters in 1974 was as follows:
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Before work (6 or 7A.M.), tea and bread.
Late morning break (11A.M.), water and biscuits.
Lunch break and rest (1-3P.M.), water rum or beer.
After work, bread or rice, canned sardines or
herring, tea or water. (Phillips 1976)
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CHAPTER III "...ME NO LIKE THIS CO-OPS BUSINESS"
The Sugar Workers ' Cooperative Movement
Before proceeding with an assessment of the Barham pilot
Co-op project, it is important to trace the origins and
development of the cooperative program. The 1960's, with
Independence, launched an upsurge in Jamaican nationalism.
A vocal cadre of politicians, academicians, planners and
other activists opposed Jamaica's economic relationship
with foreign-owned multinational firms, who in their view,
drained her resources and sent profits abroad. The sugar
industry, in particular, became a target of harsh criticism;
(Phillips 1976:242-45.) Sugar plantations being regarded
as inequitably large concentrations of wealth, power and
land, which stifled productive opportunities for small-
holders.2 Furthermore, an increasing amount of concern was
being directed at estate working conditions.
Shortly thereafter, sugar revenues entered a downswing,
which was aggravated by mounting production costs that
continued to rise despite mechanization and reduction of
the labor force. Alarmed at the industry's dismal profit
picture, the West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO), a Tate
and Lyle subsidiary, took advantage of the Jamaican
political climate to divest itself of its field operations;
since processing, manufacturing and shipping, rather than
cane cultivation, have always been the most lucrative
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concerns of sugar production. In the late sixties, negotia-
tions opened for transferral of estate lands from corporate
to government ownership; entailing some 40,000 acres of
land on the first, second and fourth largest estates and
approximately 30% of total sugar production. There were,
of course, some strings attached. Terms for the sale of
WISCO's holdings specified continuation of cane cultivation
by whoever controlled the lands for ten years after the
purchase date and also required processing of all sugarcane
grown on that land in WISCO's factories. (Phillips 1976:530.)
Following the acquisition of estate lands, the Jamaican
Government designed a plan to subdivide and sell 300 to 500
acre parcels to medium-sized corumercial farmers. Estate
staff members also lobbied for a share of the spoils and
devised elaborate schemes for use of the lands. (Stone 1978:
5.) Fieldworkers, in the meantime, began to harbor serious
misgivings about the future of their jobs. Their non-
participation in the decision-making process coupled with
a lack of information regarding policy matters heightened
the workers' fears and uncertainty. (Phillips 1976;247.)
In 1969-70, small sugar belt citizens' associations,
active in housing scheme planning, expanded their agenda
to resolution of the estate land reallocation issue. Mo-
bilized by Jesuit priests originally assigned to help with
housing, an embryonic corp of organizers advocating work-
er control began to discuss the Government land purchase
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issue. (Phillips 1976:527-28.) Most of the organizers'
early efforts to call forth the fieldworkers were greeted
with skepticism and apprehension. Concern for job security
and personal advancement left many workers ambivalent about
the strategic utility of membership in SWCC, when weighed
against the benefits of management patronage. Others sim-
ply found it hard to believe that such a revolutionary re-
form would ever take place. Consequently, the most vocal
proponents of the incipient co-op movement remained a
peripheral minority that consisted primarily of better
educated, articulate and more financially secure headmen
and foremen; well-versed by the Jesuits in cooperative
principles and theory. (Phillips 1976:554-55, Stone 1978:
5-6.)
In 1972, under the democratic socialist leadership of
Prime Minister Michael Manley, original Government plans
for the use of the estate lands changed.3 Manley endorsed
the co-op movement, that had at that point, developed a
more formal structure and named itself the Sugar Workers'
Cooperative Council (SWCC). (Phillips 1976:530, Stone 1978:
5.) But ideological consonance did not necessarily render
agreement on the basic structure or type of cooperatives
to be formed. The Government envisioned collectivist-
modelled farms managed and operated by workers; sharing
equipment, labor and profits. (Phillips 1976:532.) On
the other hand, most SWCC members preferred a land lease
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program that would provide individual workers with 25 or 30
acre parcels, supported by common infrastructure and ser-
vices. SWCC's suggestion excluded 70% of the workers who
would have, most likely, been left jobless and landless,
or forced to work under former co-workers; perhaps with
some negative feelings. (Stone 1978:6.) This was an early
warning that SWCC, the self-proclaimed champion of the
masses, was losing touch with grass root interests. (Stone
1978:6.)
In 1974, the Frome Monymusk Land Company (FMLCO), an
agency created to administer the estates, set up three
2,000 acre pilot cooperatives on the Frome, Monymusk and
Salt Pond estates. The farms were organized under col-
lectivist guidelines, in spite of resistance from SWCC and
its Jesuit mentors. (Stone 1978:6.) The rest of the farms
were to remain under the traditional structure until they
were all finally transformed, on a phased basis, into a
cluster of cane-producing cooperatives. (Phillips 1976:533.)
Manley's endorsement gave the co-op movement more momentum
by rallying greater mass support. (Stone 1976:6.) But while
some workers saw the creation of the program as a monument-
al achievement, others still wanted no part of it for
various reasons. As Phillips perceived:
"...many workers did not begin to accept the
land issue...as a means to attaining a more
desirable change in identity and self-image.
-43-
It was above all, the idea of growing sugar
canes which disturbed some workers trying to
decide about joining SWCC. While their fel-
low workers might see tha attainment of
control over the estate lands as a major
step forward, they themselves wanted nothing
further to do with sugar cane. Here again,
the traditional identification of sugar cane
with dependence and slavery emerged. Indeed,
here the more general and vague identifica-
tion of plantation work with slavery and
dependence and all things undesirable in
personal image and identity was refined
and focused on the growing of the plant
itself. For such workers, after years
of toil in the canefields, sugar held
no good whatever, and had meant nothing
but poverty and hard work. Sugar re-
mained the 'sweet malefactor' and they
could not break away from that overwhelm-
ing experiental realization. (Phillips 1976:
554.)
Phillips goes on to explain the distrust of some of
the workers:
"...the very idea of themselves becoming
active agents and promoters of sugar culti-
vation was tantamount to selling one's soul
to the devil; and courting a very dangerous
and tricky enterprise as well. (One -man said,
suspiciously after hearing of the sale of
other sugar estates in Jamaica to the Govern-
ment, 'If the White Man a comin' outa sugar,
then somethin' goin' wrong with the sugar!')
Indeed, growing sugar for oneself represent-
ed to at least a few estate workers not only
a contract with evil. itself, but a dangerous
business which might be a trap set by the
White managers and businessmen (and others)
to pawn off a losing business on the Black
Man". (Phillips 1976:555.)
Phillips adds that careful examination and analysis of
estate returns in the early 1970's lend factual credence
to such a suspicion. (Phillips 1976:555.) But even for
those who were receptive to the cooperative program,
acceptance of the very notion that ordinary cane workers
like themselve could now spurn the yoke and own the same
lands which for generations had bound them in subservience,
demanded a radical reversal in orientation. (Phillips 1976:
551.)
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Profile of the Barham Area
Barham farm is located on the Frome estate in the parish
of Westmoreland. After Emancipation, the exodus of Black
people from the plantations was less pronounced here than
in most other parishes. (Cumper 1954:122.) Planters in
Westmoreland protested early Black independent settlement,
and so random occupation of abandoned backlands and outlying
areas became the dominant settlement pattern rather than
the founding of organized peasant-type communities with
legal title to land. (Cumper 1954:123.) Today, the majori-
ty of residents in the Frome vicinity are dependent solely
on plantation wage income. (Cumper 1954:143.) Furthermore,
the decline of sugar's dominance in Westmoreland was much
less significant than elsewhere and the From estate remains
the dominant industry (Cumper 1954:122), the greatest single
source of employment and occupies some 30,000 acres or one-
seventh of the parish. (Cumper 1954:119.)
The people of Barham lived in Frome or its immediate
outskirts. A total of 131 of the 163 members responded
to a questionnaire which yielded data on housing conditions,
tenureship, income, employment and household composition.
The mean age of the membership was 45.6 years, with little
deviation around the mean, so most members had worked un-
der the WISCO regime for 20 to 25 years before joining
the co-op. Men made up 76% of the membership and earned
substantially more than women members. Men averaged
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J$42.91 per week compared with J$25.85 for women. This
undoubtedly posed hardships in a society where women are
often chief breadwinners and are obliged to assume the ma-
jor financial burden of childrearing. Mean household size
was 6.0 persons, with 2.7 children 15 years of age and
under for all households. Mean household income was
J$56.95,5 therefore co-op workers provided a substantial
chunk of family income; most being employed for a total
of 43.7 weeks out of the year.
The majority of the cooperators' homes were described
by them as being in poor condition (55%), 40% were judged
either good or fair and only 4% were considered in excellent
shape. 95% of dwellings were constructed from wood frames
with corrugated iron roofs or wattle (interlaced branches
and weeds), and only 5% from concrete. Only 7% had elec-
tricity, 80% had no water and only 4.7% had toilte facili-
ties. Most homes were overcrowded with an average of 6.0
people living in 2.2 rooms. While 88% of the sample were
homeowners, only 24.6% owned the land on which they lived.
Those who did live on their own land claimed that they had,
on average 1.9 acres. Other lived on family land, leased
land, rent-free land, estate land or co-op land.
Social Relations of "Cooperation"
Organizational structure did not change significantly
under the cooperative system. Just as before, WISCO dic-
tated when cane was to be burned, cut and sent to the
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factory and set the price to be paid for Barham's output.
So in these respects, WISCO still held the trump card. The
Frome Monymusk Land Company, established to implement and
coordinate the cooperative program in a consultant capacity,
occupied elite status. The Land Company staff took charge
of technical and economic planning. This involved important
decision-making at the staff level which hindered the early
development of a strong local level co-op management. But
matters could not have been handled otherwise during the
first few years because the Land Company wanted to minimize
economic risks which might have led to an irreversible fail-
ure of the project. The eleven member Managing Committee
was democratically elected by the general merbership to
run co-op affairs. Committee members were, on the whole,
the most educated, literate and articulate cooperators,
and many had also been "headmen" and "drivers" under WISCO.
Their amenability and knowledge of cooperative principles
was most likely due to SWCC influence. The Land Company
assumed that the necessary information and awareness
would be spontaneously channelled through the Managing
Committee to the general members.
Considering these circumstances, it is interesting to
compare the Land Company's ideas concerning the new coop-
erative enterprise with those of the general worker-members.
The Land Company's concept of the worker as owner was
based on certain characteristics considered typical of
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most agricultural proprietors; such as responsibility and
care of business matters, complete personal involvement not
limited to a work schedule and willingness to face difficul-
ties, particularly those which occur at the beginning of a
venture. On the other hand, for the worker-members, being
an "owner" in the sugar industry meant the following: not
to engage in strenuous manual labor, to profit from the work
of others, to deny the worker an improvement in working
conditions, to be authoritarian, and to have unlimited en-
joyment of all of one's rights.
The contradiction in the conception of ownership in
each group manifested itself in the attitudes of the members,
expressed in these terms:
1. How could workers still cut cane if they were
now "owners"?
2. From the perspective of the general members, as
"owners", everyone had a right to give orders. But in
practice, this right was restricted to the Managing Com-
mittee and even more so to the Land Company. This, along
with point 1, created disillusionment because members
imagined roles for themselves which reality did not permit.
3. Now that they were "owners" the workers, in prin-
ciple, no longer needed a trade union to settle grievances.
But without a trade union, the general members' felt power-
less in their dealings with the Land Company, who were
regarded as the "real" owners since they gave the orders
and held the pursestrings.
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For these reasons, general members overwhelmingly felt
that the co-op had done little to improve their low status
position. As a result, co-op members related to the Land
Company staff in much the same terms as they did WISCO
management; referring to them as the "Big Men". In fact,
some people preferred the Company worker-owner relationship
to the co-op. As one women said, shaking her head in
apparent disgust:
"...Me no like this co-ops business. Me
prefer work for the Big Men them. Working
in the co-ops it plenty hard and rough. Me
must work harder than in WISCO days".
When asked if she would be willing to return to Company
employment if given the chance, this woman insisted that
she would. At least the Company made no pretenses about who
was boss.
It was still common to hear members address the Project
Manager assigned to Barham as "Busha", (who was a kind,
well-liked Black man, but who was also their former over-
seer under WISCO), and the work gang supervisors as "Driver"
and "Headman"; all terms left over from slavery. Their
skepticism was confirmed daily when they used farm equip-
ment still bearing the WISCO insignia, and when each week
they received paychecks printed and signed by the Frome
Monymusk Land Company. As one Managing Committee member
pointed out:
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"Workers still think everything is in the hands
of the Land Company. They don't believe that
the co-op is for them. I always try .to put it
to them that it is for them but them still
don't involve."
Another added:
"Most people don't realize that the co-op is for
them. Most people don't realize that that they
are now working for themselves. Rathar than
taking some initiative, they want to receive
orders and directions all the time. They think
things are the same as before".
When asked to account for the low level of interest and
involvement in co-op affairs and poor meeting attendance,
another Management Committee member replied:
"The workers don't participate because some
of them don't believe that they are on their
own. They think they are just working for
their money and there is nothing in back of
it. Most of the members, they don't have
any mind in the co-op. Them only just come
fe work for a few shillings and go. Them
don't show any interest".
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It was obvious to most cooperators that there had simply
been a transfer of authority from WISCO to the Land Company,
so the Managing Committee, viewed as an instrument of con-
trol, had a very fragile relationship with general member-
ship. Most felt that their elected leaders, supposedly
answerable to their constituents, had become despotically
intoxicated with power. In the words of one general member;
"...I don't have no control over what happen in
the co-op. I look and hear what them say only.
I don't have no control over it. We don't have
any deciding to make. Its only the men them
on the Committee. What the Headman say, me
don't have any control over what the Headman
say.. .we have to go by it. The Headman, he
tells us what to do. They make the decisions.
They make many promises but you can't see any
yet and them say they are going to make a housing
scheme for members, but it not come true yet so
we are still looking out".
Another commented:
"Sometimes the general meetings go right, some-
times they go contrary. Sometimes the Managing
Committee just try to impress more than anything
else. The meetings can be improved by more bet-
ter teachment in the agricultural business so we
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know how to handle our membership and they should
talk to we in a more decent way and try to get
everybody to come together".
A wide communication gap, as well as a credibility gap
expanded the animosity between leaders and members. The
general members' poor access to information concerning
business matters was a perpetual source of anxiety. Low
levels of literacy which ranged between 40% and 50% made
it even more difficult for members to familiarize them-
selves with the workings of cooperatives in general as well
as the operation of their own enterprise. (Stone 1978:2.)
There were daily complaints that no one explained policies,
procedures and important decisions. As one woman loudly
exclaimed into the tape recorder:
"The Management Committee, what they hear from
the bigger staff they don't told us. I want
to know about this co-op! How my vacation is
going; how the profit is going. I want to
know something about this co-op. I want to
understand about it"'
Other members expressed similar views:
"The biggest problem is lack of knowledge and
understanding. The workers are not being
given enough knowledge. People who know and
understand must mix with the ones that don't
so that they can give them knowledge. The pur-
pose of the meeting should be like when you went
to school, to teach each one you know"
"We need a school. We need to be taught...
organize classes. I don't know if the others
will take it, but we should give it a try".
"...Like this office building, no member
know how much it cost and no members know
when it going up. No one knows if it is
the co-ops who building it or the Land
Company or what"!,
Members grumbled about the office building quite often,
but a more pressing concern was the issue of severance,
sick leave and vacation pay. With the changeover to the
cooperative system, the people of Barham, as participants
in the pilot project, were told that their checks would
soon be forthcoming. Everyone at Barham was excited at the
thought of getting money, particularly since the Independence
holiday weekend was drawing near. Big celebration plans
and promises were made to family and friends. At the last
minute, members were told that the money would not come
until much later, due to a bureaucratic Land Company error.
Hostility and tension brewed for many days after this
incident:
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".. .But we are not getting the amount of money
as before. Me usually gets vacation pay and we
get an increase".
"According to us it is not running how it
should go on like before. We usually get
sick leave benefits and we are not getting
it again. If you meet any accident, nothing
at all and before if we meet accident we get
something for it and now none of that. We
should have some idea of what's going on
but we don't have it, we don't know. Them
who do know don't tell me, me can't tell
you what's going on, we really don't know,
we really not satisfied a bit, no, no"
Another confusing situation came up following the re-
ceipt of an unexpected bill sent by the Land Company to
Barham. The bill, which amounted to approximately one-
quarter of a million dollars, was casually handed to the
Managing Committee and to the accounting clerk by a repre-
sentative from the Kingston office. No one bothered to
explain the charges to co-op members and it was obvious to
all that the Managing Committee members felt nervous, in-
secure and out of control because they were unacquainted
with accounting jargon and mathematics. So, no cooperator
was in a position to verify or dispute the figures on the
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bill, yet the money was handed over to the Land Company
representative without informing the general membership.
Distrust and resentment reached a peak every payday;
an incredibly hectic occasion at Barham. Members crowded
around the office to collect their checks, and if there
was even the slightest error (a common occurence), the
accounting clerks were verbally abused and the Land
Company and the Managing Committee accused of trying to
"tief " the members. Actually, many workers spent quite a
great deal of time and energy in making sure that they were
not being cheated by what was, at least theoretically, their
own business establishment. Similarly, some spent a lot
of time trying to "beat the system". Once, a member was
brought before the Management Committee to be reprimanded
for shirking some of his duties. Evidently, he was caught
lying to his "driver" about having completed some task.
This man's case is a classic example of Patterson's (1967)
"Quashee" resistance; one of several types that appeared
among plantation slaves and typically involved trick-play-
ing or commission of small acts of cunning against "Busha".
Ironically, the man was almost fired for his misdemeanor
by the Managing Committee in the true WISCO tradition, but
was saved by Land Company intervention.
Thus, it was inescapably discernible to all concerned
that the authority to make far-reaching decisions affecting
all aspects of the life of the group was still vested in
persons and institutions-outside the community. Moreover,
such decisions were still not locally palpable, but con-
tinued to define the critical context in which the people
of Barham had to live.
One of the main concerns of the Barham study was to
explore factors that motivated cane workers to participate
in the cooperative scheme at Barham. Most of their moti-
vations centered around an understandably hedonistic pre-
occupation with earning a few more dollars:
"I joined the co-op because I better could
buy a house...its very important to get
more money".
"Mr. Levy explain it to I and I saw progress
in it. That's why I joined. I get more mon-
ey, I foresaw plenty benefit in the co-op".
"I joined because the co-op has a purpose
to get me some more money. Things are better.
I buy more things. I'd like them to help me
get more money".
Other mentioned that workers were told that if they
joined the co-op they would receive WISCO severance pay
amounting to substantial cash payments ranging from J$1,000
to J$2,000. Although members were asked to invest half of
this sum in the co-op, for cane workers who are characteris-
tically low-income, this was a tremendous incentive to
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participate.6 (Stone 1978:7.)
A number of people explained that farmers who formerly
worked on Company-owned lands were left with no other op-
tions. Their age, lack of skills and rural location would
have made it extremely difficult for them to find employ-
ment on the already sparse Jamaican job market:
"...Why I joined the co-op is because they
have no more industry and we have to stay
here and work in sugar. I have nowhere else
to go for there is no more industry in West-
moreland and I have to stay here and look
after my children and I don't have no place
to go so I stay here and joined the co-op".
"I joined the co-op because I am not in the
position to leave and go on to what I want.
I joined because the majority had to join".
Managing Committee members were more enthusiastic and
displayed a good command of Marxist-oriented cooperative
rhetoric:
"Well, the reason why I join the co-op is we
usually work for the capitalists and it come
to the time now that we can understand that and
we work now for ourselves. We is suppose to be
better off. When we work for the capitalists
them, we only build them up for you work a
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certain amount and what you get out of it
is very small and them have the majority
for themselves".
"...All of us can unite together, pull to-
gether. That's the only way we and our
families can prosper. We must unite to-
gether and have fellowship together...
we must combine to organize our work to-
gether...We now be responsible, we can
care better than when we worked for the
Company, and we have the benefit of what's
remaining when it is completed".
"I joined the co-op for a better living
and to build the country. I would like
to see the co-oDs come forward, not back-
ward, and to build the country and to make
Jamaica better instead of money going out,
to make it stay in and build the country.
That's why we join the co-op, to let the
money circulate in the country... to build
our country".
"...Well, as far as I understand it, we will
be able to get the profit instead of the White
Man getting it and we will get to share. The
co-op is for the benefit of us all...we come
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first. The co-op will make things better, not
just for myself but for all of us involved.
We have more privileges, we are self-employed
persons...all the profit will be for us and we
will be able to honor ourselves more".
I found these statements to be encouraging, but wondered
if perhaps the Managing Committee's enthusiasm arose from
the realization that within Barham's limited confines, their
status was elevated by their new leadership roles.
When asked what the aims and goals of the co-op should
be, one general member answered:
"...To get some more money to buy more
things. The aim is to help me get some
more money".
Similarly, another responded:
"The co-ops will be better in the future.
They will get on more better and get us
money money".
Although these types of aspirations were typical, others
were secondarily concerned with long-term, yet still ma-
terialistic benefits:
"I would like the co-op to help us with holding
land such as our own to put the house on".
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"I want some help to build up a house and
to school my children, whether they lend
us money or open up some school that will
help the children. One thing I think the
co-op should do is help us with our children
to educate them, that's number one".
".. .Well most of us we want a better home
and longer ahead we might even have a shop-
ping center for our own self. We might have
homes, shopping center and a place or play
games I hope, so when you come home from
working you have something refreshing around
you and your friends are there. Sit down
and have a red stripe and all that, and
laugh and talk and then go home to get a
good rest".
Excitement was voiced about the prospect of implementing
housing scheme for those in need of new homes and the possi-
bility of establishing a home improvement loan program.
Some expressed the necessity of opening a store for pur-
chasing food and supplies bought in bulk and sold at cost
to help members offset the high costs of living. Other
recommendations included the provision of insurance and
pension plans and the pruchase of burial spots for members
of the co-op. In general, monetary incentives and the
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satisfaction of basic needs were viewed as attractions and
goals rather than the less tangible gains such as pride of
ownership, solidarity, tec. or collective concerns such a
crop production methods or harvest yield. Pragmatism, a
hedge against poverty, went hand-in-hand with an individual
concern for self-survival.
. Ideologically, the co-op emphasized the primacy of the
group, but the work system tended to atomize this group
consciousness throuqh individual assignment of work and
individual contracts of payment. Each gang worked in iso-
lation on a set of tasks; knowing little of what was occur-
ing on other parts of the farm. Members were paid accord-
ing to the number of cane rows personally completed each
day; a remnant of the WISCO piecework system; and therefore
strength and skill were determinants of income rather than
conscientiousness. So working relationships were often
based on self-centered, instrumental exchanges ("I'll
scratch your back if you'll scratch mine") and the recurrent
theme of estate worker individualism and competition was
preserved in the new system. The lack of interdependence
became subtly visible during our conversations when con-
stant usage of the pronouns "me", "I" and "they" predomina-
ted when "we" could have easily been substituted. Probes
for group reasoning, group concerns and group sentiment
usually evoked statements such as: "How can I say what
they think"?, "Everyone is different, I can only speak
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for myself", or "I don't know about them...I can't say".
But friendships still thrived. At noon, the work gangs
crowded into thatched lean-tos in the canefields to eat
lunch and escape the midday sun. Lunchtimes were always
enjoyable social events and very communal affairs. Those
who brought their green bananas, dumplings, coco yams, salt
fish and tea would share with those without food and no one
every went hungry. But the sense of "we-ness" exemplified
here stemmed from a reactionary awareness of class member-
ship; most often expressed as we the powerless "little men"
against them the monolithic "big men"; rather than class
consciousness in Marxist terms, which would actively
threaten the existence of the established order. (Mintz
1974:314-15.)
When Barham co-op members were asked what they wanted
their children to do when they became adults, most chose
professions like mechanic, teacher, doctor, nurse, barrister,
engineer, typist etc. Some answered that they wanted to
see their children do what ever kind work they wished, and
others said that they didn't know. Interestingly enough,
most members claimed that they wouldn't mind seeing their
children join the co-op if work became available in the
future, but specified that their children should fill
higher status positions such as typist, accounting clerk,
project manager, education officer... No one preferred
to have their children work in the canefields:
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"No! .. .me rather dead than fe see me pickney
dem work inna de cane for it too hard and
rough! Me can't let them work as I do"!
As members of the wider society, the people of Barham
are motivated towards achieving success, acquiring cultural-
ly valued goods and aiming at the upward mobility of their
children. To this extent, social reality does not corres-
pond to the cooperative ideology. This has serious im-
plications for the program Jamaica is now pursuing. If such
a program seeks the support of rural dwellers and seeks to
improve their social and economic condition it is useful to
know what the beneficiaries' orientations really are. Pro-
grams which presume that the cane worker wishes to stay in
the cane and typically wishes his children to do the same,
when he really wants to escape the plantation and enter the
"modern" sector, are doomed to failure unless there is a
radical change in the social and economic milieu. (Foner
1972:151.) New progressive roles and attitudes prescribed
by cooperative ideals have not diminished long-established,
slanderous stereotypes depicting Black unskilled cane-
cutters as the most destitute, backward and unmotivated
people in Jamaica; a by-product of the historical develop-
ments discussed earlier. (Phillips 1976:556-57.) To this
day, virtually no one in Jamaica would voluntarily chose
unskilled farm labor, canecutting in particular, as a
desired career path.7
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In the Cooperative program, the Jamaican Government
has attempted to attach a more positive image to sugar
work. As one cooperator pointed out:
"In WISCO times no one really know us. But
now the Gleaner write us up, the Prime
Minister visit our farm and everybody hear
about us on the news".
But even so, at the present rate, effacement of the
imprint left by centuries of oppression from the national
psyche may take decades to complete.
Conclusion
One could easily assume that the transfer of ownership
from WISCO to the Frome Monymusk Land Company to the Barham
workers and the concurrent movement away from the tradition-
al colonial system to cooperative ownership, would have
instilled a collective morale. But the Barham study suggests
that the transfer demanded much more than receipt of a land
lease and an infusion of rhetoric. The critical problem
existed in the class divisions between the worker-members,
the Managing Committee, and the Frome Monymusk Land Com-
pany; which were disappointingly reminiscent of the old
colonial plantation structure. Consequently group inter-
action, attitudes towards work, aims and expectations,
the internal role/rule structure and the wider organiza-
tional setting, as perceived by the members of the coopera-
tive, constitute behavior that would have been just as
appropriate under the WISCO regime.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III
1. See the New World Quarterly issue on sugar (1967).
2. The present distribution of farm acreage among the
various size groups of farms reflects a fundamentally
unequal pattern. A relatively small number of very
large holdings not only account for a very high pro-
portion of the arable land area, but by and large, con-
tain the best agricultural land. In 1968, farms over
500 acres comprised on 16% of all farms but occuDied
44.87% of the agricultural land. On the other hand,
farms less than 5 acres, the average size sold to
smallholders, comprised 77.96% of all farms but
occupied only 14% of the land. (Jefferson 1972:81.)
In addition, 83% of the farmers accounted for less
than 25% of the total income for agriculture.
(Jefferson 1972:82.) It is true that throughout
Jamaica the existing areas of small settlement appear
to have reached the limit of their carrying capacity
with present techniques and organization. (Cumper
1954:125.) Given the population pressure and the
poor quality of the land, farmers can hardly make a
living on these small holdings. (Beckford 1972:24.)
Thus it appears that opportunities for peasant
production have become increasingly restricted with
the expansion of plantations (Beckford 1972:25.)
3. See Manley (1974).
4. One Jamaican dollar is presently equivalent to US$1.21.
In 1975, one Jamaican dollar was worth US$.88.
5. In the 1973 to 1975 period, sugar earnings rose from
$35 million to $74 million in 1974 and $139 million
in 1975, although output remained constant. Due to
the large increases in foreign exchange earned by the
industry, wage rates increased by about 100%. Accord-
ing to Stone's survey (1978), the upward adjustment
in wage rates for the first time brought the sugar
worker close to national wage levels and raised workers
take home pay from $600 to $800 per annum to $1,200
to $1,600.
6. This idea of comparing conceptions of "ownership" is
borrowed directly from Vessuri and Bilbao's study on
Argentine sugar co-ops in Nash 1976.
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7. Carl Stone's more recent survey of all three pilot
farms revealed that 80% were motivated by the promise
of instant cash, while only 20% expressed an interest
in cooperative values.
8. M.G. Smith's (1960) study of occupational choice in
Jamaica showed that few children or adults willingly
choose any type of agricultural work, especially un-
skilled, as desired employment. Although Smith's
study is somewhat dated, in the author's opinion,
the findings still hold true.
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CHAPTER IV CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the Government's good intentions, replace-
ment of foreign multinational plantation ownership with
workers' cooperatives reinforced, rather than removed,
class stratification and the tradition of elite domination.
Sugar workers at Barham, rightfully suspecting that coop-
erative tenure was merely a cosmetic reform, clung to a
worldview that had helped them to endure the WISCO regime;
subverting the development of a cooperative spirit. For
them, the issue of who controlled the means of production
remained secondary to more immediate concerns such as
earning enough income to feed, clothe and house their
families.
Stone's article (1973) provides an epilogue to the
Jamaican experiment in cooperation. The introduction of
the co-ops in 1974 and 1975 witnessed a boom period in
the sugar industry generating revenues which were partially
used as an investment in the new program. The financial
successes of the pilot projects in their first year were
used as evidence to support the argument that the co-op
system would work. By the end of the first crop year,
SWCC led agitation for full co-op conversion of all the
remaining farms on the three estates. Mass demonstrations
were used to pressure the Government to place an additional
17 farms under co-op management before a thorough assess-
ment of their economic viability was conducted.
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By 1976, the export earnings by the Government to support
its cost structure. The co-op program had, therefore, to
contend with the disillusioning effect of downturns in the
industry and it became evident that the co-ops had inherited
many of the inefficiencies of large scale estate production.
In the third year of co-op production (1976-77) budget pro-
jections showed that the production costs were higher than
the guaranteed price paid for cane by the sugar factories;
deficits being highest at Frome and Monymusk, the two
largest estates. Drought exacerbated these problems and
reduced output by 25% to 35%; causing a decrease in wage
income and an increase in operating deficits. An unre-
mitting depression of the sugar market coupled with ill-
effects of the current Jamaican economic crisis of inflation
and foreign debt threaten to destroy the last shreds of
cooperative commitment. Willingnes.s to withstand this
difficult period will depend on the degree to which co-op
members feel that they have a real stake in the program's
success or failure. Although this study is critical of
some aspects of the cooperative program, the author is in
agreement with the Jamaican Government's efforts to achieve
economic development without a highly unequal distribution
of wealth, social status and political power. The problems
discussed here are common to all societies trying to build
socialism on a similiar base.
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In Jamaica, there was no equivalent to the 1959 revolu-
tion in Cuba, where the colonial plantation structure was
destroyed and the industry completely nationalized. In
Cuba, it is reported that much has been achieved in reform-
ing the plantation system, where class is now of lesser
importance and where sugar workers, nationally viewed as
the vanguard of the revolution, are highly motivated to
participate in national development. (Beckford 1972:219.)
But it is still uncertain that the right conditions can
be created through political, organizational and education-
al means. The current situation is likely to remain un-
changed unless there is a radical transformation in the
existing economic arrangement.. Exploration of new possi-
bilities for redirecting emphasis from sugar to the pro-
duction of diversified food crops to satisfy domestic needs
would be more economically beneficial to Jamaica and more
palatable to the farming population. In the meantime,
the bureaucratic management system could be restructured to
minimize authoritarianism, open communication channels to
keep cooperators in touch with developments which affect
them and to facilitate the transfer of skills so that the
cooperatives can eventually wean themselves from technical
and administrative dependency.
The original study of the Barham Sugar Workers'
Cooperative included a feasible, short-term plan of action
to make Barham a more workable organization. In con-
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structing this list of recommendations we tried to come up
with ideas which we felt would meet the members' approval,
based on a synthesis of their own suggestions for improving
the co-op:
1. There were 163 members in the Barham Cooperative
and approximately 25% of the membership was composed of
women. However, there were no women representatives on the
Managing Committee. This was a great loss since, as anyone
visiting the co-op would have agreed, the women members
were among the most militant and vocal people on the farm.
Furthermore, there were several women who possessed a great
deal of leadership potential. We recommended that a special
allotment be made so that each time a new Committee was
elected at least three of the members would be women.
2. It was noted that most of the members of the Coop-
erative had a very low level of knowledge of business
affairs. To a great extent, this was due to schism between
the Managing Committee and the general members. Several
factors accounted for the credibility gap; the primary
factor being the secretive nature of the workings of the
Managing Committee whose meetings were closed to general
members. In fact, whenever other members were caught
loitering around the office when Managing Committee meet-
ings were held, they were promptly shooed away. Since
there was no rule in the Cooperative Charter prohibiting
open meetings, we suggested that in the future, all general
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members should be allowed to attend and that the minutes
of each meeting be made public. In this way members would
help to lessen alienation and allow members to reflect upon
all issues facing the Committee.
3. Democratic procedures were not enforced at Barham
and the general membership should have played a more active
role in decision-making processes. The Managing Committee
should not finalize any proposals without the knowledge
of the general membership. For example, a straw vote could
be taken in order to decide the final outcome of all de-
cisions, followed by a discussion of the minority view
which could then be followed by a real and final vote.
This would give all members some measure of control and
give the Committee an advisory role rather than an authority
role.
4. The Managing Committee should be rotated more often
than every 6 months. Everyone would then have an opportuni-
ty to assume leadership and to become more involved in
policy-making. ParticipaLion in management affairs need
not be contingent upon literacy. Although many members
could not read or write they were definitely not lacking
in their verbal ability to express views and could have
had significant influence in co-op administration.
5. A series of seminars and lectures should be
organized for the members of the co-op, geared toward
instilling some enthusiasm, with both technical and
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ideological content. Guest speakers from the University,
the School of Agriculture and from the Land Company itself
could be invited to give presentations and to show films
depicting the success of co-ops in other parts of the world.
Most important, a series of "rap sessions" should be organ-
ized so that everyone will be encouraged to air their views.
In August, 25 people from Barham were invited to attend
a retreat at the Jamaica School of Agriculture. During
their one-week stay, members of the three Pilot Cooperatives
attended seminars and lectures similar to those we have
described and participants were given time off from work
with pay. Similar retreats should he held on a rotational
basis so that eventually, all members would get a change
to attend.
6. The use of slavery-time terms such as "Busha" and
"driver" should be strongly discouraged. These terms are
not only degrading, but have no place in the new order.
As long as sugar workers continue to use such vocabulary
to describe the position of other workers on the farm in
relation to themselves, they are verbally reinforcing
their low status image in the eyes of their peers as well
as in the eyes of outsiders. Instead, the term "Busha"
could be replaced by either Project Manager or simply Ms.
or Mr. X. A "driver" could just as easily be called
Supervisor or Mr. or Ms. X.
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7. All eftorts to convince co-op members that they
were working for themselves were futile when week after
week they received paychecks printed and signed by the
Frome Monymusk Land Company, and used farm equipment
and vehicles bearing the WISCO insignia. We recommended
that new payroll forms, checks and letterhead be printed
with Barham Sugar Workers' Cooperative Ltd. printed boldly
at the top and the same be stencilled on all farm equipment.
(Ironically, "Barham" was the last name of one of the
early colonial British proprietors.)
8. The members of the Barham co-op had no facility
where they could all meet together at one time, and des-
perately needed a hall large enough to serve a dual function
as both meeting place and recreation center.
9. When an institution or a movement is founded from
the desire to achieve a particular end, it is develop-
mentally necessary to define new issues and goals to pur-
sue after the original end has been achieved. If not, the
movement loses continuity, momentum and in effect becomes
"stalemated". Land acquisition and cooperative ownership
were achieved at Barham as original ends, but will lose
strength as rallying agents over the course of time. It
was therefore necessary for Barham to seek new challenges
which would be personally relevant to its members and
motivate group action on an ongoing basis. (Phillips 1976:
522.) For instance, co-ops in other parts of the world
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have been used to provide a variety of services ranging
from the usual marketing and provision of credit to the
promotion of welfare objectives such as health, housing,
education and general community improvement. Barham should
begin long range plans for pension, retirement, etc. It
might also be worthwhile to organize a credit union, and a
shop to provide food and supplies. The housing survey
indicated that most people are interested in either repair-
ing or adding to their homes. It would be useful to in-
stitute a loan program and to consider building a housing
scheme for those in need of new homes.
10. There were several people working on the farm who
were not members, such as the Project Manager, the Assis-
tant Project Manager, the accounting clerks and some tem-
porary workers hired to help harvest the crop. Incorpora-
ting these "outsiders", many of whom hold prestigious
positions, would promote greater equality of status and
increase their commitment to the co-op.
11. All general meetings should be held during working
hours and be made mandatory with the Secretary present to
take attendance. If the meetings were held during the day,
members could not complain that they have other responsi-
bilities preventing them from attending. They would also
not be deterred by fatique after a long day's work in the
fields. In fact, a paid one-hour break during the working
day would probably be a very welcome change.
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12. Barham should consider putting the vacant houses
located on the farm into immediate use. These houses were
all co-op property and were going to waste, when they could
have been rented out or used by the co-op members them-
selves for social activities.
13. The method of payment at Barham was contrary to
cooperative principles. Land owners make their living
from selling produce, not from the number of cane rows
they chop in a given day. The piece work system is a
remnant of WISCO days and a more equitable form of profit
sharing is advisable.
14. There was a great deal of mystery surrounding the
payment of sick leave and vacation money. Workers felt
that they were being cheated and that they received fewer
benefits than when they worked for the estate. Perhaps it
would be more agreeable to retain the old payment schedule
so that members would not have to reorganize their house-
hold budgets.
15. Ownership of individual plots for food production
has traditionally been cherished by rural Jamaicans, as it
represents security, dignity and freedom.. It would there-
fore be highly beneficial to set aside small parcels of
cooperative land for subsistence crop cultivation.
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